
















QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
    
Duffield, Lee R. (2009) Historical and Personal Perspectives on the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall, 1989: address to 20th anniversary forums. In: Berlin Wall Anniversary: 
Commemorative Event, 9 November, 2009, Centre for Independent Studies, St 
Leonard's, Sydney. (Unpublished) 
 
    © Copyright 2009 please contact the author 
Historical and Personal Perspectives on the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
 
Lee Duffield PhD, Senior Lecturer in Journalism, Queensland University of  
Technology 
 
Address to the Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 9.11.09 
 
The story of the fall of the Berlin Wall was an aspect of the “imagination gap” that we 
had to wrestle with as journalists covering the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in Europe. 
 
I was the ABC European Correspondent at the time, based at Brussels, and found that, as 
so many of the old certainties and habituated landmarks of life were crumbling, it was 
scarcely possible to believe what you found yourself reporting. 
 
The experience developed into a fascination with the phenomenon of the almost 
unthinkable coming true, such sweeping social change in a short time, that it developed 
into my doctoral project, completed in 2002, and then the book published this year, 
Berlin Wall in the News, an “academic” publication from VDM publishers in Germany. 
 
Reporting the events in question was a two-track process. On one hand a mass social 
movement was dictating the pace and direction of events; on the other, the institutional 
business of politics as usual, to provide a framework for all the change that was 
happening, had to be managed – and reported on. 
 
Where did the change come from in Eastern Europe? 
 
The short answer to my investigations is that the source of that change was the failure of 
the Soviet Union, and I am pleased to say, after reviewing 5297 reports, published in 
elite media outlets between July 1989 and January 1990, that the news media got the 
story right. Present-day consensus on the history of the Wall is in accord with the 
contemporary coverage. (My work has also included extended interviews with 
correspondents who took part in that coverage, for the 2002 dissertation, and review of 
histories that were appearing a decade after the “Wall”). 
 
Poland has been a contender for the honour of starting the process of change. The visit of 
the Polish Pope in 1979 saw an assertion of civil society, where citizens attended to 
crowd control, and ostentatiously, and literally turned their backs on the state police. 
Economic failures brought forward the Solidarity free trade union movement, and after a 
fresh crisis in 1988, it brought the communist party to the round table. 
 
Out of the negotiations, came the agreement to hold free elections, on 4 and 18.6.89, in 
which the government party would be given a “start” in the form of a bloc of pre-
allocated seats. However it was unable to win the three seats it needed to retain a majority 
of the joint Houses, the Sejm and Senate, and so, lost government. It is a comment on the 
weakened state of civil society, that by their own accounts, no party knew enough of 
electoral politics to realise what would happen in the country’s prevailing dire 
circumstances; to be prepared for a communist party defeat. 
 
The spotlight immediately turned to the reformist leader of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. He congratulated the winners. All of Eastern Europe 
watched keenly, and noted, that the USSR would not intervene, and saw the parties in 
Poland set up over a period of months, a government actually headed and controlled by 
non-communist members. 
 
On the day of the first round of voting, the Tienanmen Square massacre occurred in  
Beijing. In my own case, this meant the story which, dubiously we thought might be the 
beginning of the end of the Eastern Bloc, would be relegated for a time out of the 
headlines. A massive transport accident in Russia, and the death of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini in Iran, also contributed to the displacing of the Polish milestone, in the 
media’s “first draft of history”. 
 
Hungary was a contender for the role of catalyst for the change. After 1956, the 
communist party there had moved over the decades to a moderated style of government, 
its so-called Goulash Communism, so that in 1989 a reform faction was emboldened to 
take control, and opened the frontier with Austria. The “Iron Curtain” was breached, and 
hundreds of thousands of East Germans began their exodus, driving their Trabants 
through neighbouring states, into Austria and then West Germany. 
 
October in East Berlin. That brought us to the crucial time, 7.10.89 in East Berlin, and 
the German Democratic Republic’s attempt to celebrate its fortieth anniversary. The 
exodus of citizens, and workers, was making a mockery of the anniversary, by beginning 
to bankrupt the country, and robbing the government of any moral authority to hold 
office. 
 
I was among hundreds of Western news correspondents let into East Germany for the 
“celebrations”; of course taking the opportunity to assess generally conditions on the 
other side of the wall; and witnessing and broadcasting the demonstrations that broke out.  
The scene was set for the opening of the Wall, on 9.11.89. 
 
From the journalists’ perspective, it looked like a wave of change rolling towards the 
Soviet Union, and the idea, against all habits of thought, that the Soviet state itself would 
be undermined. Again, the imagination gap came into play and invoked caution in 
reporting what seemed to be taking place. In reality the flow was the other way; the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was already well advanced and affecting the developments 
in Europe.   
 
Soviet decline. Gorbachev had embarked on his policy of reasonableness and reform, to 
try to save the USSR. The Soviet Union was in extreme crisis. The economy – badly 
unbalanced, weighted against consumer production -- was burdened heavily by military 
spending equal to the United States, but on the base of a far smaller economy. Also, as 
Gorbachev said repeatedly, it was being bankrupted also by crises – the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident, and the massive earthquake in Armenia – and by oil prices that 
remained low, for one reason or another, over a protracted period. Whereas the Soviet 
Union had achieved Nikita Kruschev’s goal of equalling the USA in heavy industrial 
production, the West had moved on to newer and more efficient forms of production. The 
advent of computers had enabled a vast liberalisation of finance industries, and creation 
of new wealth, which the USSR could not match. Personal computers of course were a 
great challenge also because of the cultural and political factors involved in releasing 
such a communicative force into general society. In its deteriorated state, the Soviet 
Union was unable to raise capital for investment and restoration. 
 
Gorbachev’s government sought to remove its burden through drastic cuts in military 
spending and going to the West for investment. This required amelioration with the West, 
and so we saw, and would follow the Gorbachev “road show” in Western Europe and the 
United States – the Soviet leader proclaiming his commitment to the “common European 
home”. In these circumstances – making large concessions on armaments, and seeking 
financial salvation – he would not support the Eastern European “satellite” governments 
if they could not stand on their own feet, in the face of public rejection. 
 
Gorby, save us! So we return to East Berlin at the start of October 1989, with Mikhail 
Gorbachev in town as guest of honour for the anniversary. He was presented as endorsing 
the communist system in power in East Germany, and this interpretation had to be given 
credence even as contrary evidence became plain. He had let Poland go, and while the 
implications of that remained unclear, demonstrators shouted “Gorby save us!” – or 
perhaps, “Gorby, save US!”. Members of the loosely coordinated protest movement had 
surreptitiously passed a message to groups of Western journalists on 7th October to 
suggest they be at Alexanderplatz that night. The job was pooled among the 
correspondents, some including myself going to that popular meeting place, to witness 
the demonstrations begin; with a staged fight, “bystanders” closing in to keep back any 
Stasi operatives, or trusties of the Party out to dissuade trouble-makers, the crowd 
swelling, somebody declaiming, and others proposing a march to Gorbachev’s reception 
at the Palace of the People. (One irritated police officer offered to kick this 
correspondent; later the protestors were boxed in, and many arrested). 
 
Gorbachev broke off from a visit to a war memorial to tell correspondents in the street 
what he had just told the politburo of the communist party, that “those who do not keep 
up with history will fall by the wayside”. It was loosely translated among the journalists 
on the spot but all versions carry the same point, that he would not support the neo-
Stalinist East German government on its current trajectory. It is an orthodoxy now, that 
he denied support to the East European governments that they needed; but it was still a 
new and uncertain idea at that moment. 
 
An incident at Leipzig was learned about, and reported, though again, its full 
significance was not demonstrated in that week. Protests had been building up each 
Monday night in Leipzig, and after the “Gorby” demonstrations in the capital, the GDR 
President, Erich Honecker, demanded that the protest in Leipzig on 9.10.89 be put down 
in an exemplary way. Live ammunition was issued to troops, and while this of itself did 
not portend a massacre on the model of Tienanmen Square, the situation was volatile, 
with the numbers of protesters growing rapidly. In the event the civil society asserted 
itself. The music director of the Gewandhausorchester, Kurt Masur, and other civic 
leaders, intervened with the government, as did the mational security director Egon Krenz 
– about to remove and displace Honecker – who ordered that the protest not be molested. 
The casualty of the night, was fear among the citizens. 
 
With the evaporation of fear, one million were in the street in East Berlin, on Saturday 
4.11.89; the government gripped by paralysis could scarcely administer the state, let 
alone produce credible new policies; some form of resolution would have to be reached. 
 
Announcement by Schabowski. A new communist politburo was appointed in the 
following days, and seeking desperately to save itself, began announcing measures that 
would amount to a general liberalisation. Therefore, on the night of Thursday 9.11.09, 
after its first meeting, the spokesperson Gunter Schabowski, announced to the world’s 
news media, on live television, that new visas would be introduced, permitting citizens to 
cross the “internal” German frontier to the West. He confirmed this would apply to 
Berlin, i.e. crossing over the Wall. Asked when, he said immediately.  
 
Schabowski had dropped his bombshell very late, almost as an afterthought. He might 
have explained the government’s intention to bring in the change over a few days, more 
in the normal order of things, but in his confusion didn’t. It is possible that his political 
confreres and consoeurs might have hesitated with the decision, had they guessed it 
would be presented as an “immediate” deed; though they were under very great pressure 
to take the action they did. A colleague in the hall had asked me: “Does this mean what I 
think it means?” No such doubt seemed to exist among the citizens; the meaning of the 
announcement was fully understood. They rushed to the frontier demanding to be let 
through straight away. They were going to be let through anyway, and so the gates were 
opened. The street party that followed was a manifestation of the mass social movement 
taking power, and a triumph of the human spirit. 
 
The announcement was foreshadowed. As a significant digression here; the decision to 
open the frontier had been indicated in advance, among several proposed changes, as 
evidenced in the record of media coverage. The following is extracted from the book, 
Berlin Wall in the News: 
 
“The welter of concessions announced and published in news media … included 
promises of freer travel and ending of censorship (see ABC radio, 17, 21.10.09), 
… amnesty for the border crossers and for protesters detained during Gorbachev’s 
visit (The Times 28.10.89; International Herald Tribune 28-29.10.89; Guardian 
Weekly 29.10.09), ahead of removing altogether the crime of fleeing the republic 
(The Australian 3.11.89). .. Gunter Schabowski, the politburo spokesman, was 
foreshadowing “big changes” including an unspecified lifting of certain travel 
restrictions (ABC radio 9.11,89)…  
 
“The broad range of informed opinion relayed in the news media … stayed firm 
that the hastily implemented reform program would fail to meet public demands 
for change. Typically Wolfgang Schenck, spokesperson for the dissidents’ contact 
group, East-West Forum, considered only a substantial material change could 
modify the public mood, specifically ‘it would take a strong gesture like opening 
the Wall’ (ABC radio 8.11.09). ..  The possibility of a passport reform was raised 
within a week of the change of leadership, Krenz ordering a reform of travel laws 
– though perhaps ‘over some years’ (Times 21.10.89; ABC radio 22.10.89) … It 
was mentioned also in one of the first utterances of the reform-minded Hans 
Modrow as Prime Minister (ABC radio 20.10.09), and given out as an agenda 
item for a communist party politburo meeting as ‘passports for all’ (Times 
24.10.09). The Australian’s correspondent, Nicholas Rothwell, wrote extensively 
on the announcements then being made about travel: on the foreshadowing of a 
plan to issue a new form of passport (Australian 21-22.10.89), and about citizens 
being urged by Krenz to await the new law … (Australian 23.10.89) Reuters 
reported that the promised passports law was being drafted (Australian 
26.10.89).” (Duffield 2009: 179-80) 
 
Arrangements of governments. Politics remained to be done to clean up the situation in 
institutional terms; to set up for the business of government. 
 
The United States government of the time turned out to be highly informed with a clear 
view of events and the resultant destiny. Its Ambassador in Bonn Vernon Walters made 
occasional statements in the news media predicting well the course of events – perhaps 
benefiting from access to both German and US intelligence. The United States early 
declared support for a reunited Germany within an expanded European Union. In this, it 
marginalised the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, which was recalcitrant on 
reunification. The Secretary of State, James Baker, was instrumental with other leaders in 
setting up the “4+2” talks (the wartime allies and the two Germanies), to formally end the 
post World War II partition of Berlin. 
 
The French President Francois Mitterrand was also President of the European 
Council in the latter half of 1989, and so able to speak, often, for the then European 
Community. He met the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on two or three 
occasions, to arrive at the famous “deal” that sanctioned Germany’s reunification in the 
context of a strengthened and expanded EU. The French and others would accept 
reunification and Germany would underwrite the Euro currency – giving up the 
Deutschmark.  
 
Helmut Kohl became the man of the moment, a party politician who would only speak in 
German and think to be, mainly, in the right place and the right time. His Ten Point Plan 
just after the Wall opening outlined joint work to be done by the two German 
governments through commissions, in areas such as health or the environment, with no 
timetable. This was jettisoned just before Christmas 1989 when he was mobbed by 
crowds on a visit to Dresden, calling out “we are one people”  -- to which he responded  
by including the term “fatherland” in his address. On 14.2.09 at Bonn, at a meeting with 
17 GDR Ministers to discuss the collaborative commissions, the cooperation was 
suddenly cancelled – a development signaled by the absence of a communique. The 
reason: the GDR had agreed to hold free elections; polls had started to indicate an 
emphatic victory for Kohl’s conservative political formation, and strong support for 
reunification; and so the politician Chancellor decided bluntly to go for that goal – 
electoral victory and speedy reunification. 
 
He had made other arrangements thoroughly. Discussions had started to reassure Poland 
on guaranteeing the Eastern frontier. Nine days after the “Wall”, on Saturday night 
18.11.09 at a European Summit in Paris, then later at Strasbourg, he had cited the goal of 
a reunified Germany within a European framework – a European Germany, not a German 
Europe. He had similarly met with the US President, George H Bush, and already in 
August had provided financial incentives to Hungary, to open its Western frontier – 
repeatedly in the outcome thanking the Hungarian government for courage it displayed in 
following through with its undertakings. Most of this activity was transparently handled 
and followed prominently and accurately in reporting by media; at times business was 
handled more covertly, as with the visit to Bonn of the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos 
Nemeth and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn to Bonn  – though still picked up and reported 
on, a little after the event, (e.g. in the IHT, 26-27.8.89, 1.9.89). 
 
German reunification and the European future. Finally on 3.10.09 Germany was 
officially reunified in the ceremony before the Reichstag building, with crowds gathered 
off the Tiergarten, waving both their German flags, and the European banner. On the 
night, three grand orchestras combined to present Beethoven’s 9th Symphony, and that 
German music – the Ode to Joy – became the anthem of the European Union.  
 
The five GDR states acceded to the federal republic of Germany -- the Bonn republic, 
West Germany – in a seamless legal move, for which its constitution had been designed. 
The reunified country became a part of both the NATO alliance and the European 
Community. The “1992” project for European expansion, with a single market, open 
internal borders and a single currency, was already being worked on among the member 
countries in 1989. In 1990, after their free elections, the new governments of Eastern 
Europe surprised the European Community by demanding emphatically a fast track to 
membership – wanting both to be distanced from the Soviet Union and to partake of the 
rights and prosperity of the West.  Therefore, from the Berlin Wall, came reunification, 
and with that also, formation of the European Union as it is today – an amalgam of 27 
member countries, with close to 500 million citizens and accounting  for 30 % of world 
Gross National Product. 
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